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## Program Tackles Co-ordination Of Intelligence Research Work

telligence research on various areas of the world is apparently the most permanent and vexatious in Washington. A renewed effort to achieve collaboration of the many agencies involved in the same studies is raising high hopes. The FAR program, as this one is known, is a bit like the Hoover commissions—vitally necessary, but no permanent solution.

The Foreign Areas Research Coordination Group (FAR for short) is attempting to insure cooperative effort, and a minimum of duplication, among participating agencies. It hopes to lead the way to better use of research results, and to promote efficient use of private research carried out under federal contracts. It is, for some reason, concentrating on "research in the social and behavioral sciences related to U.S. foreign policy — political, military, economic, and cultural." The four subject areas make sense, but those words "social and behavioral" can be very restrictive to government researchers:

The need for some coordination is shown by the list of participating agencies: state department; health, education, and welfare department; National Science Foundation; U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Central Intelligence Agency; Agency for International Development; and the department of defense. Also taking part are the following defense agencies: departments of army, navy, and air force; office of international security affairs, and office of defense research and engineering. The Defense Intelli-

gence Agency is not on the published lists, although it is supposed to serve the same purpose within the defense establishment.

To understand the complexity of the problem, it is necessary to understand that each of these offices may be interested in the same foreign area for the same reason (e.g., in Cuba because the Castro regime is a threat to our safety), yet each unwilling to accept anyone else's analysis or estimate of the situation. Many officials on the using end of the studies have pet theories they want supported by intelligence research reports. Some want the estimates to indicate their office needs more money and manpower. Some want to prove that a "rival" agency is surplus, or at least that it is inadequate to cope with the current situation.

The Truman administration made several valiant efforts to solve this internal rivalry in our most cloistered chambers. James Forrestal, as secretary of defense, sometimes appointed confidential research project officers, then compared their reports to those reaching his desk routinely. During the Eisenhower and Kennedy years, there was enforced coordination much of the time only because Allen Dulles, after a lifetime of work in intelligence, knew when and where to knock heads together.

FAR is a worthy project, but it is handicapped by widespread distrust of its real aims. Many workers inside "the intelligence community" fear it is really an effort to justify further disarmament, or accommodations of the Russians. If they are right, reports will be slanted to "prove" the safety of such actions.